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Introduction
Recent and ongoing reforms in several OECD countries aim at stimulating competition and patient choice among publicly-funded hospitals in order to improve quality of care (EXPH, 2015; OECD, 2012 ). In the U.S. Medicare and Medicaid programmes, hospitals are paid by Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) since 1983. Medicare and Medicaid cover respectively individuals older than 65 years old and poor patients. The DRG system involves paying a …xed tari¤ for every patient treated.
In the United Kingdom, under a policy commonly known as 'Payment by Results', hospitals are also paid a tari¤ for every patient treated, and patients are free to choose the hospital. Hospital competition is also present in other countries such as Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway.
The idea is that hospitals 'compete'on quality to attract patients and are rewarded …nancially for doing so.
Opponents of hospital competition argue that these policies will harm equity. For example, highquality hospitals will respond to competition by improving even more, while low-quality hospitals will be left behind. A recent report by the European Commission highlights that despite the extensive literature investigating the e¤ect of competition in the health sector, there is very limited literature focusing on its equity implications (EXPH, 2015) . Reduction in health inequalities are an ubiquitous policy objective, and it is surprising that it has received little attention in relation to competition. We contribute to …ll this gap in knowledge.
In this study we extend the received theoretical literature by investigating (i) whether competition increases or reduces the gap in quality between high-and low-quality hospitals, and (ii) whether, as a result, competition increases or reduces health inequalities. We focus on two dimensions of (pure) health inequalities (Wagsta¤ and van Dooerslaer, 2000, section 5). The …rst type of health inequalities is what is commonly known, in the hospital context, as inequalities due to 'postcode lottery': a patient living close to a given hospital might receive much poorer quality compared to a patient living close to a good hospital (Dalton, 2014, p.4) . The second type of health inequalities relates to disparities in health across patients with di¤erent severity: if high-severity patients bene…t less from competition than low-severity patients, health inequalities will worsen.
The equity concern across severity groups is regularly re ‡ected in sub-group analysis (by severity type) in cost-e¤ectiveness analysis (Sculpher and Gafni, 2001) . Given that we have two sources of health inequalities, we also investigate how competition a¤ects the Gini coe¢ cient, a commonly used measure to empirically assess health inequalities within or across countries (Wagsta¤ and van Dooerslaer, 2000) .
Our choice of theoretical framework is a Hotelling model with two hospitals competing on quality and located at the extremes of a unit line. In this respect we follow the existing theoretical literature, where quality competition is typically analysed within a spatial competition framework.
We allow one hospital to have a comparative advantage so that hospitals provide di¤erent qualities in equilibrium. We focus on two measures of competition: (i) an increase in the …xed price, and (ii) a reduction in transportation costs. A higher price increases the pro…tability of attracting more patients, and therefore stimulates the hospitals to compete on quality. A reduction in transportation costs can be interpreted as an increase in patient choice, where patients are encouraged to choose hospitals based on quality and therefore stimulates competition. Patient choice can be enhanced by the introduction or the enhancement of public reporting of quality indicators (Siciliani, Chalkley and Gravelle, 2017) .
Our key …ndings are as follows. Whether competition increases or reduces quality di¤erences across hospitals is generally ambiguous, and depends on two key factors related to the demand for health care and the cost of health care provision, namely (i) the marginal health gains from quality and (ii) the extent to which quality a¤ects marginal treatment costs. The answer also depends, to some extent, on how we measure competition, whether by an increase in the …xed price or by an increase in the degree of patient choice. Our most clear-cut result is that quality convergence across hospitals is a more likely e¤ect of increased competition, regardless of how it is measured, if marginal health gains decrease with quality at a faster rate.
Whether competition increases health inequalities depends on the type of inequality and the e¤ect does not necessarily have the same sign as the change in hospital quality di¤erences. If health gains are linear or not too concave in quality, health inequalities due to postcode lottery go hand in hand with health inequalities: they will increase (decrease) whenever competition induces quality dispersion (convergence). But if health gains are concave in quality to a su¢ cient degree, then health inequalities can reduce even if competition induces quality dispersion, and they will always reduce if competition induces quality convergence. Competition generally reduces health inequalities between high-and low-severity patients, because high-severity patients bene…t more from higher quality than do low-severity patients. However, this reduction can be strengthened or weakened by what we refer to as 'composition e¤ects', which relate to competition inducing high-severity patients to exercise choice more than low-severity patients by selecting hospitals with 3 higher quality.
We then derive the e¤ect of competition on aggregate measures of absolute and relative inequality, namely the Generalised Gini and Gini coe¢ cients, respectively. These measures are conceptually distinct from the above-mentioned measures of dispersion across hospitals and severity groups. Consider for example the case with just one severity group. Even if competition increases di¤erences in health outcomes across hospitals (an increase in inequalities due to postcode lottery), the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient may still reduce if competition induces more patients to go to the high-quality hospital. Similarly, if competition has no e¤ect on di¤erences on health outcomes, the Gini coe¢ cient will still reduce as a result of the overall increase in quality. With two severity groups, numerical simulations based on two di¤erent parameterisations of the model suggest that competition (whether measured by price or patient choice) tends to reduce both absolute and relative inequality when the shares of high-and low-severity patients are not too di¤erent. One of the main driving forces is that competition tends to reduce inequalities between high-and low-severity patients, regardless of how competition is measured and regardless of whether competition leads to quality dispersion or quality convergence.
In line with the existing literature, our theoretical model assumes that hospitals are pro…t maximisers and suggests that an increase in competition increases quality (Ma and Burgess, 1993; Wolinsky, 1997; Gravelle, 1999; Beitia, 2003; Nuscheler, 2003; Straume, 2006, 2007; Gaynor, 2006; Karlsson, 2007) . This result also holds with altruistic providers but only if the degree of altruism is not too high Straume, 2011, 2012 ; see also Barigozzi and Burani, 2016) .
The seminal empirical study by Kessler and McClellan (2000) suggests that competition increases quality. This result is also con…rmed by Tay (2003) , but only partially by Shen (2003) while Gowrinsankaran and Town (2003) …nd a negative e¤ect. The latest evidence from England suggests that competition, as measured by the introduction of patient choice policies, increases quality under di¤erent empirical approaches (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013; Bloom et al., 2015) . There is only one empirical study which directly tests the e¤ect of competition on equity. Cookson et al. (2013) …nd that competition did not harm equity, as measured by di¤erence in hip replacement utilisation across socioeconomic status in England. This study is not directly relevant for us given the focus on utilisation as opposed to quality and health outcomes, and the focus on socioeconomic inequalities as opposed to pure health inequalities. Although not focussing on equity, not for low-severity patients, therefore providing indirect evidence that health inequalities across severity groups reduced. Some empirical studies (Dafny, 2005; Farrar et al., 2009 ) also test the e¤ect of price changes on quality, but none of them focuses on equity implications. Our approach is positive rather than normative. Although we could derive the optimal pricing rule set by a welfare maximising regulator, in reality hospital prices are …xed and are set to re ‡ect average treatment costs. We therefore prefer to investigate how competition a¤ects health inequalities under current common …nancial arrangements.
The study is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive equilibrium quality. In Section 3, we investigate how competition a¤ects quality di¤erences across hospitals, and in Section 4, how competition a¤ects health inequalities. Section 5 draws implications for empirical analyses. Section 6 concludes the study.
Model
Consider a market for a healthcare treatment (e.g., a coronary bypass or a hip replacement) o¤ered by two di¤erent providers (hospitals), located at opposite endpoints of a Hotelling line of length 1. Demand comes from a unit mass of patients who are uniformly distributed on the line. At each point of the line there is a share of high-severity patients, denoted by h. The remaining patients have lower severity and are denoted by l. A patient of type k who is treated at Hospital i has the following utility:
where B k ( ) is the (expected) health status of a patient with severity k following healthcare treatment; q i q is the quality of treatment at Hospital i; d is the distance travelled by the patient, and t is the marginal cost of travelling. The lower bound q on quality represents the minimum treatment quality that the hospitals are allowed to o¤er, and we can interpret the case of q i < q as malpractice. We assume that: (i) for a given level of treatment quality, the patient with higher severity is in worse health, even after treatment, B h (q) < B l (q); and (ii) the patient with higher severity bene…ts more from a marginal increase in treatment quality, i.e. @B h =@q > @B l =@q > 0 for all q. Thus, for a given level of treatment quality, the di¤erence in health status across highand low-severity patients is smaller the higher the quality of treatment.
leads to the following demand functions for high-and low-severity patients, respectively, at Hospital i:
where i = 1; 2, j = 1; 2, and i 6 = j. Total demand for Hospital i is then
while total demand for Hospital j is D j = 1 D i .
Each hospital is assumed to maximise pro…ts. Under the assumption that the (regulated) price p is the same for both types of patients (e.g., DRG tari¤ for a coronary bypass), pro…ts of Hospital i are given by
where c k i (q i ) is the marginal cost of treating a patient with severity k, and C(q i ) is the …xed cost of quality (e.g., MRI machines). We assume that the …xed cost of quality increases with quality at an increasing rate, @C=@q i > 0 and @ 2 C=@q 2 i > 0, that the marginal treatment cost increases (weakly) with quality, @c k i (q i ) =@q i 0, and that the cost of treating a high-severity patient is higher than the cost of treating a low-severity patient, c h i (q i ) > c l i (q i ) for all q i . We also assume that hospitals di¤er in marginal treatment costs, with Hospital 1 having a cost advantage: c k 1 (q 1 ) < c k 2 (q 2 ) and
The hospitals simultaneously choose qualities in a non-cooperative one-shot game. We consider an interior-solution Nash equilibrium in which both hospitals choose treatment quality above the minimum level. This Nash equilibrium is implicitly characterised by a pair of …rst-order conditions, given by 1
1 Second-order and stability conditions are given in the Appendix. 6 where
@B l @q i :
Given our assumptions on the hospitals' cost functions, the Nash equilibrium is asymmetric and the hospital with a cost advantage provides a higher quality, q 1 > q 2 .
Competition and quality di¤erences
What is the e¤ect of competition on quality provision? In particular, does …ercer competition reduce or amplify quality dispersion between the hospitals? Our modelling framework allows us to consider two di¤erent policy measures that stimulate competition: (i) more high-powered …nancial incentives in the form of a higher treatment price, p, and (ii) increased patient choice, which is captured by a reduction in the transportation cost parameter, t. For ease of exposition, we refer to the degree of patient choice (i.e., a positive measure of competition, as for an increase in price)
as r := t. Higher r could for example be due to policies which implement public reporting of quality measures in the public domain. The former policy makes it more pro…table to attract patients, whereas the latter policy makes demand more responsive to quality changes. In both cases, incentives for competition are intensi…ed.
Higher treatment price p
It is possible to show (see Appendix) that a higher price leads to higher quality for both hospitals in equilibrium: @q i =@p > 0, i = 1; 2. The main e¤ect is that a higher price increases the price-cost margin and therefore makes it more pro…table for each hospital to attract more patients by providing higher quality. If the marginal treatment costs increase with quality (i.e., if @c k i (q i ) =@q i > 0), this e¤ect will be reinforced by competition due to qualities being strategic complements. 2 These e¤ects are well known from previous literature. In this study we are interested in investigating whether the price increase ampli…es or reduces equilibrium quality di¤erences, de…ned by := q 1 q 2 . Using (A5)-(A6) in the Appendix, this e¤ect is given by
where the expressions for H > 0, @ 2 i =@q j @q i 0 and @ 2 i =@q 2 i < 0 are given in the Appendix.
The sign of @ =@p is generally ambiguous. It depends on the di¤erence between the demand responsiveness to quality of Hospital 2, weighted by the sum of the degree of concavity of the pro…t function of Hospital 1 and its degree of pro…t complementarity in qualities, and the demand responsiveness of Hospital 1, similarly weighted.
The condition for whether a higher price leads to quality convergence or quality dispersion can be more extensively stated as follows:
where
We can interpret B i as the expected marginal health gain from quality in Hospital i across both severity types; c i as the degree of convexity of marginal treatment costs with respect to quality in Hospital i, and p i as Hospital i's pro…t margin, weighted by the degree of concavity of the demand function.
Under the condition of equilibrium stability, both sides of the inequality in (9) are positive.
Since by assumption Hospital 1 provides a higher quality, the marginal health gain from quality, and therefore demand responsiveness, is (weakly) higher in Hospital 2 relative to Hospital 1,
(with a strict inequality if B k ( ) is strictly concave). In turn, this tends to give a stronger incentive for Hospital 2 to increase quality, relative to Hospital 1, therefore reducing dispersion in qualities 8 across hospitals.
However, changes in quality also a¤ect the marginal pro…tability of quality (i.e., the degree of concavity of the pro…t function) and the degree of complementarity in qualities across hospitals, which are captured by the terms in brackets in (8) . For example, if the marginal pro…tability of quality is higher for Hospital 1 as a result of the price and quality increases, then Hospital 1 may increase quality more than Hospital 2. In order to further characterise the other relevant terms, we introduce some additional assumptions:
A1 The weighted pro…t margin is higher for the provider with a competitive advantage, p 1 p 2 .
A2
The …xed-quality-cost function C ( ) is quadratic.
A3
The marginal treatment cost, c k i (q i ), is linear in quality.
A1 holds if the equilibrium pro…t margin of the high-quality hospital is su¢ ciently large relative to the low-quality hospital. If @ 3 B k =@q 3 i 0, A1 holds as long as the marginal treatment cost advantage of Hospital 1 is not overturned in equilibrium (i.e., c k 1 (q 1 ) c k 1 (q 2 )). Furthermore, A2 essentially rules out the possibility that the sign of (9) is determined by potential mechanisms related to the sign of the third-order derivative of the …xed-quality-cost function. Finally, A3
ensures that the degree of convexity of marginal treatment costs with respect to quality is the same across the two hospitals, which implies c 1 = c 2 = 0 and 1 2 . After deriving results that hold under A1-A3, we will brie ‡y discuss the implications of relaxing A2.
Applying A1-A3, the condition in (9) reduces to
where k := @ 2 C=@q 2 1 = @ 2 C=@q 2 2 . The general ambiguity remains, but we can now more precisely characterise each of the two possibilities by identifying the following set of su¢ cient conditions: 3 Proposition 1 Given assumptions A1-A3:
(i) If the marginal health gain from quality is strictly decreasing, @ 2 B k =@q 2 i < 0, and if the e¤ ect of quality on marginal treatment costs, @c k i =@q i , is su¢ ciently small, a higher price leads to quality convergence in equilibrium, @ =@p < 0.
3 Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are given in the in Appendix.
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(ii) If the marginal health gain from quality is constant or decreases slowly with quality, and if the high-quality hospital has a cost advantage in the provision of quality in equilibrium, @c k 1 (q 1 )=@q 1 < @c k 2 (q 2 )=@q 2 , a higher price leads to quality dispersion in equilibrium, @ =@p > 0.
(iii) If the marginal health gain from quality is constant, and if marginal treatment costs are constant, @c k i =@q i = 0, a higher price does not a¤ ect quality di¤ erences in equilibrium, @ =@p = 0.
The proposition highlights the two main mechanisms at work: (i) the concavity of the health bene…t function, which determines the relative magnitudes of B 1 and B 2 , and (ii) the di¤erences in the e¤ect of quality on marginal treatment costs, which determines the relative magnitudes of 1 and 2 .
The former mechanism contributes to quality convergence in response to a price increase. A strictly concave health bene…t function implies that the marginal health bene…t of quality is higher for patients in the low-quality hospital, which in turn implies that demand responds more strongly to quality for this hospital. A price increase will therefore lead to a larger increase in the marginal revenue of quality for Hospital 2 than for Hospital 1, contributing, all else equal, to quality convergence between the two hospitals. However, this e¤ect is counteracted by di¤erences in the e¤ects of quality on marginal treatment costs, which relate to the degree of pro…t concavity and of pro…t complementarity in qualities. If quality has a smaller e¤ect on marginal treatment costs in Hospital 1, this hospital has a stronger incentive to increase quality in response to a price increase, leading, all else equal, to higher quality dispersion between the two hospitals.
In addition to these two counteracting e¤ects, which are given by the relative magnitudes of B 2 =B 1 and 2 = 1 , respectively, there is the e¤ect of p 1 p 2 . This e¤ect, which is also related to di¤erences in the degree of concavity of the pro…t functions of the two hospitals, works in the direction of quality convergence in response to a price increase. Thus, in broad terms, demand e¤ects (mainly through demand responsiveness) tend to induce quality convergence, whereas cost advantages in quality provision tend to induce quality dispersion.
Assumption A2 eliminates potential e¤ects due to the convexity of the …xed costs of quality.
To highlight and isolate the role played by the …xed costs of quality, suppose that health bene…ts are linear in quality and treatment costs are constant (but lower for Hospital 1 than for Hospital 2). This implies B 1 = B 2 and p i = c i = i = 0, which means that (9) reduces to
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Whether qualities diverge or converge as a result of a price increase depends on the di¤erence in the degree of convexity of the cost function across hospitals (evaluated at equilibrium qualities).
Since q 1 > q 2 , the condition in (17) is equivalent to
Thus, if the degree of convexity in …xed costs increases (reduces) with quality, a price increase will induce quality convergence (dispersion).
Increased patient choice r
In a symmetric model with pro…t-maximising providers and regulated prices, there is a wellestablished positive relationship between increased patient choice, measured as a reduction of transportation costs, and equilibrium quality provision. In our asymmetric setting, lower transportation costs have however additional e¤ects on unilateral quality provision incentives. On the one hand,
as in a symmetric model, increased patient choice makes demand more quality elastic, which gives both hospitals an incentive to increase quality. On the other hand, for given quality levels, increased patient choice implies that a larger share of each patient type chooses the high-quality
hospital. If marginal treatment costs increase with quality, @c k i =@q i > 0, such a reallocation of demand implies higher (lower) marginal cost of quality provision, and therefore weaker (stronger) incentives for quality provision, for the high-quality (low-quality) hospital. However, by applying the …rst-order conditions, (6) , it can be shown (see Appendix) that the former e¤ect dominates the latter, implying that the results from a symmetric model also carry over to an asymmetric one. Increased patient choice leads to higher quality provision in equilibrium for both hospitals:
Whether patient choice leads to quality dispersion or quality convergence is a priori ambiguous.
Using (A10)-(A11) in the Appendix, the exact condition is given by
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where p i , c i and i are de…ned by (11)-(15), and
Compared to the case of a higher price, the criterion for quality convergence or dispersion as a result of lower transportation costs depends somewhat less on the concavity of the health bene…t function and somewhat more on the characteristics of the treatment cost function, in particular the relationship between marginal treatment costs and quality. Once more applying A1-A3, the condition in (18) reduces to
Notice that, whereas 2 1 and p 1 p 2 , the relative magnitudes of 1 and 2 are a priori ambiguous. The next proposition establishes a su¢ cient condition for one of the two possible outcomes:
Proposition 2 Given assumptions A1-A3, if the marginal health gain from quality is constant or decreases slowly with quality, and if the e¤ ect of quality on marginal treatment cost, @c k i =@q i , is su¢ ciently small, increased patient choice leads to quality dispersion in equilibrium, @ =@r > 0.
To gain some intuition for this condition, notice that the right-hand sides of (16) and (21) are equal, whereas the left-hand sides are di¤erent. Thus, whether considering a price increase or an increase in patient choice, the e¤ects of 2 1 and p 1 p 2 are similar in both cases and work in the directions of quality dispersion and quality convergence, respectively. However, the left-hand side of (21) introduces two new e¤ects that are speci…c to the case of increased patient choice. Both e¤ects are related to treatment cost advantages but work in opposite directions.
(i) Increased patient choice r implies that demand becomes more responsive to quality, which increases the marginal revenue of quality and gives both hospitals an incentive to increase quality.
If c 1 (q 1 ) < c 2 (q 2 ), the pro…t margin is higher for Hospital 1, which implies that the increase in marginal revenue of quality, due to more quality-responsive demand, is also higher for Hospital 1, which gives this hospital a stronger incentive to increase quality. This e¤ect contributes, all else equal, to quality dispersion.
(ii) The increase in demand responsiveness due increased patient choice also implies that, for given qualities, demand is shifted towards the high-quality hospital (i.e., @D 1 =@r > 0 and @D 2 =@r < 0). If marginal treatment costs depend on quality, the demand increase (decrease) for the high-quality (low-quality) hospital implies that the marginal cost of quality provision increases (decreases) for the high-quality (low-quality) hospital. All else equal, this gives the high-quality
(low-quality) hospital an incentive to reduce (increase) quality. This e¤ect works in the opposite direction of (ii) and contributes, all else equal, to quality convergence.
The opposite natures of (i) and (ii) contribute to the general ambiguity of (21) . However, if the e¤ect of quality on marginal treatment costs is su¢ ciently small, (ii) becomes irrelevant and so does the e¤ect related to 2 1 . Furthermore, if the marginal health gain from quality decreases at a su¢ ciently slow rate, the e¤ect related to p 1 p 2 also becomes irrelevant. In this case, which is identi…ed by Proposition 2, the only relevant e¤ect is (i). Notice that, if @c k i =@q i is su¢ ciently small, the basic assumptions of our model ensures that
Again, assumption A2 eliminates potential e¤ects due to the convexity of the …xed costs of quality. In the special case of constant marginal treatment costs (c 1 < c 2 ) and linear health bene…t functions, which implies 1 = 2 = p 1 = p 2 = 0, the condition in (21) reduces to
which, due to the strict convexity of …xed costs of quality C, is always true for q 1 > q 2 . 4 Di¤erently from an increase in competition through an increase in price, increased patient choice always induces quality dispersion under constant marginal treatment costs and linear health bene…t functions, regardless of the degree of convexity in the …xed costs of quality.
Parametric examples
In order to illustrate the general results stated in Propositions 1 and 2, and to gain some additional insights regarding the main mechanisms of the model, we proceed by exploring some parametric examples.
The previous analysis has revealed two key determinants of whether increased competition leads to quality convergence or quality dispersion, namely (i) the degree of concavity of the health bene…t function, and (ii) the degree to which quality a¤ects marginal treatment costs. In the following two parametric examples, we will consider each of these two dimensions separately, which also allows us to obtain closed-form solutions.
In both examples, we parameterise the …xed costs (of quality) function as follows: C (q i ) = (k=2)q 2 i . Furthermore, for simplicity we disregard patient heterogeneity (with respect to severity) by setting = 1. This is without loss of generality, since the share of high-severity versus low-severity patients does not qualitatively a¤ect the relationship between competition and quality dispersion. 
In this case, equilibrium qualities are given by
The e¤ ect of increased competition on quality di¤ erences is given by
(ii) Suppose that B ( ) is logarithmic and given by B (q i ) = + ln q i :
The e¤ ect of increased competition on quality dispersion is in this case given by
In the benchmark case of constant marginal health gains of quality and constant marginal treatment costs, we know from Propositions 1 and 2 that a higher price has no e¤ect on quality dispersion whereas increased patient choice lead to increased quality dispersion. Example 1 illustrates that this is changed by the introduction of a concave health bene…t function. Whether the health bene…t function is quadratic or logarithmic, a higher price always leads to quality convergence, which is consistent with Proposition 1. In the case of a quadratic health bene…t function, increased patient choice also leads to quality convergence if the degree of concavity (measured by the parameter ) is su¢ ciently large, which is consistent with Proposition 2. In this case, di¤erent competition measures have the same e¤ect on the sign of quality di¤erences.
However, if the health bene…t function is logarithmic (or quadratic with a low degree of concavity), increased patient choice always leads to quality dispersion, and di¤erent competition measures have opposite e¤ects on hospital quality di¤erences. This is explained by the fact that p 1 = p 2 in this parametric example, which implies that the only mechanism in play is the e¤ect related to the higher pro…t margin of Hospital 1 (which implies 1 > 2 ).
Overall, Example 1 illustrates that the presence of decreasing marginal health gains of quality increases the scope for quality convergence as a result of more competition, but also that di¤erent competition measures can have di¤erent e¤ect on quality dispersion across hospitals. It is also worth noticing that A1 holds for both quadratic and logarithmic health bene…ts, even though the logarithmic form implies @ 3 B=@q 3 i 0, which suggests that this assumption is not overly restrictive. and that marginal treatment costs are given by
where c 1 < c 2 . In this case, equilibrium qualities are given by
The e¤ ect of increased competition on quality dispersion is given by
Consistent with Proposition 1, the combination of constant marginal health gains and qualitydependent marginal treatment costs imply that a higher price leads to quality dispersion. Increased patient choice yields the same outcome if the price is su¢ ciently high relative to marginal treatment costs. Thus, even if marginal treatment costs are strongly a¤ected by quality (i.e., c i is large), increased patient choice will nevertheless lead to higher quality dispersion if the price is su¢ ciently large. In this case, the dominating mechanism is the one that is caused by the pro…t margin being higher for the high-quality hospital, as explained in Section 3.3.
The main insights from the above examples are summarised in Table 1 . The most clear-cut conclusion that can be drawn is that the scope for increased competition to instigate quality convergence increases with the concavity of the health bene…t function. This applies in particular to the case of increased competition induced by price increases. However, there is still a relatively wide range of parameter con…gurations for which price increases and increased patient choice have opposite e¤ects on quality di¤erences. 
Competition and health inequalities
In the previous section we have characterised the conditions under which competition induces a reduction or an increase in inequalities in the level of quality across hospitals, which we have referred to as quality convergence and quality dispersion, respectively.
In this section we investigate how competition a¤ects health inequalities. In our model we have four groups of patients who di¤er in severity and the provider from which they receive the treatment, and we answer this question in three steps. First, we look at inequalities in health outcomes across hospitals. These can be thought of as inequalities arising from the 'postcode lottery': some patients will have worse health outcomes than others simply because they live closer to a low-quality hospital. Second, we look at inequalities in health outcomes between patients with high and low severity, and check whether competition increases or reduces the health gap between the two patient groups. Third, we look at aggregate measures of (relative and absolute) health inequality based on the Gini and Generalised Gini coe¢ cients since these have been commonly used in the health economics empirical literature to measure health inequalities.
Absolute health inequalities across hospitals (postcode lottery)
When considering health inequalities across hospitals, we restrict attention to inequalities within each patient type. As long as health outcomes (e.g., mortality rates) are risk adjusted, the analysis would be similar in the presence of patients with di¤erent severity. For a given level of severity, the di¤erence in health outcomes of patients being treated at Hospital 1 and 2, respectively, is given by
The e¤ect of competition on health inequalities is consequently given by
@ k @r = @B k @q 1 @q 1 @r @B k @q 2 @q 2 @r :
If competition induces quality convergence, i.e., if it reduces inequalities in quality across hospitals in addition to raising quality in both hospitals, then competition also reduces health inequalities. If the marginal health gain from quality is constant, inequalities are driven by di¤erences in quality.
This e¤ect is reinforced if the marginal health gain from quality is decreasing and therefore smaller in the hospital with higher quality. Reductions in inequalities in quality always reduce health inequalities.
If competition induces quality dispersion, i.e., if it increases inequalities in quality across hospitals, then the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities is instead ambiguous. It is only when the health gain from quality is linear or not too concave that inequalities in levels of quality go hand-in-hand with health inequalities, so that quality dispersion increases health inequalities. If the marginal health gain from quality is decreasing, the larger quality increase in Hospital 1 arising from competition can be dampened or even o¤set by the smaller marginal health gain of quality, and quality dispersion can therefore reduce health inequalities. The second part of the Proposition 3 can be illustrated by considering the parameterisations used in Example 1 of the previous section. For both types of health bene…t functions (quadratic and logarithmic), a higher price leads to quality convergence and therefore (by Proposition 3) to reduced health inequality between patients within each severity type. On the other hand, the e¤ect of increased patient choice on health inequalities is a priori ambiguous. With a quadratic health bene…t function, the e¤ect is given by
It is relatively straightforward to see that the sign of this expression is positive (negative) if is su¢ ciently low (high). There are two di¤erent forces at play here, both of which work in the same direction. A higher value of (which implies a more concave bene…t function), increases the scope for increased patient choice leading to less inequality even if di¤erences in quality increase.
In addition, a more concave bene…t function also increases the scope for quality convergence as a result of increased patient choice, as shown by Example 1.
Consider an illustrative numerical example, with p = k = t = 2, = c 2 = 1 and c 1 = 0:5, which yields the following e¤ects of increased patient choice on quality dispersion and health inequality: (i) < 3:26 : @ @r > 0 and @ @r > 0: (ii) 3:26 < < 6:53 : @ @r > 0 and @ @r < 0: (iii) > 6:53 : @ @r < 0 and @ @r < 0:
The interesting case is (ii). When the degree of concavity is in an intermediate range, increased patient choice leads to quality dispersion but simultaneously reduces health inequalities within each severity group, because marginal health gains from quality is decreasing at a su¢ ciently high rate.
Using instead the logarithmic health bene…t function in Example 1, it is straightforward to show that @ =@r = 0. In this case, and regardless of the degree of concavity of the health bene…t function, the increase in quality di¤erence across hospitals due to increased patient choice is exactly o¤set by the counteracting e¤ect of decreasing marginal health gains, leaving health inequalities una¤ected.
Absolute health inequalities between high-and low-severity patients
In this sub-section we investigate how competition a¤ects health inequalities across patient severity.
These could be due to patients di¤ering in severity within the same condition or across conditions. For example, for patients who had a heart attack (within the same health condition), high severity patients have a history of heart conditions or other comorbidities. Across conditions, we could think of high-severity patients as patients with cancer as opposed to patients in need of a cataract surgery (low-severity patients). 5 The average (or expected) health outcome for a high-severity patient is given by
which can be re-written as
The similar expression for a low-severity patient is
Health inequalities between patient types can then be de…ned as :
Higher treatment price The e¤ect of a price increase can be expressed as
The …rst term is the e¤ect on health inequality for given patient allocations. A higher price leads to higher quality provision at both hospitals. Since the health gain of higher quality is larger for highseverity than for low-severity patients, the inequality in health outcomes between the two patient groups is reduced. Therefore, the …rst e¤ect is unambiguously negative, and this is regardless of whether a price increase induces quality convergence or quality dispersion. The last two terms capture the e¤ects of changes in patient composition as a result of the price increase, and the sum of these (second-order) e¤ects is a priori indeterminate.
If the marginal bene…t of quality is decreasing at a su¢ ciently low rate, the direction of the patient composition e¤ect (i.e., the second and third terms in (29) ) is uniquely determined by whether or not competition leads to quality dispersion. To see this, consider the extreme case of linear health bene…ts, which implies @B k =@q 1 = @B k =@q 2 = @B k =@q. The expression in (29) can then be rewritten as
By the assumption @B h =@q > @B l =@q, the expression in square brackets is positive. This implies that, if competition leads to quality dispersion, i.e., if @ =@p > 0, the …rst-and second-order e¤ects go in the same direction, and a higher price always leads to less health inequality (on average) between high-and low-severity patients. Thus, in the case of @ =@p > 0, the …rstorder e¤ect is reinforced by the following second-order e¤ect: Since a higher price increases quality dispersion between the hospitals, and since high-severity patients are more responsive than lowseverity patients to changes in quality dispersion, the share of high-severity patients in the highquality hospital will increase, which further reduces the health inequality between these two groups of patients. This illustrates how increased disparities in quality across hospitals do not necessarily imply increased disparities in health outcomes across patient types. In the above example, the opposite holds. Since it is the most disadvantaged group, i.e., the high-severity patients, who bene…t most from di¤erences in qualities across hospitals, health inequalities are actually reduced.
Increased patient choice The e¤ect of an increase in patient choice is given by
@B h @q 1 @q 1 @r @B h @q 2 @q 2 @r
The …rst three terms are completely equivalent to the previously explained e¤ects of a price increase.
However, a change in patient choice also has an additional e¤ect, given by the last term in (31) .
As previously explained, an increase in patient choice makes demand more sensitive to quality di¤erences, which implies that a relatively larger share of high-severity patients will choose the high-quality hospital. All else equal, this extra e¤ect contributes in the direction of competition leading to less inequality in health outcomes between high-and low-severity patients.
Whether we consider an increase in price or in patient choice, notice that the e¤ect via changes in quality di¤erences, represented by the second and third terms in (29) and (31), respectively, is identical in both cases. If the marginal health bene…t of quality is constant, the sum of these two terms are negative, thereby contributing to lower health inequality, if competition leads to quality dispersion. The reason, as previously explained, is that it is the most disadvantaged patient group who bene…ts more from quality dispersion. By continuity, this holds also for health bene…t functions with a su¢ ciently low degree of concavity, which allows us to summarise the above derived results as follows: When seeing Proposition 4 in conjunction with Propositions 1 and 2, we can further pin down the cases in which competition reduces health inequalities across severity types:
Corollary 1 Suppose that A1-A3 hold, and suppose that the marginal health gain from quality is constant or decreases slowly with quality. In this case, a price increase will always reduce inequality between patient types, whereas increased patient choice will reduce inequality if the e¤ ect of quality on marginal treatment cost is su¢ ciently small.
The following Table 2 
Aggregate measures of (absolute and relative) health inequality
In the previous subsections we have studied the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities along two di¤erent dimensions: (i) inequalities between patients treated at di¤erent hospitals (arising from the postcode lottery) and (ii) inequalities between high-and low-severity patients. An aggregate measure of inequality which allows to trade o¤ inequalities along di¤erent dimensions is the Gini coe¢ cient, which is also a function of the share of (high/low severity) patients who receive high and low quality. To illustrate the role of the latter we start with a simpli…ed framework with only one severity level, and then extend to two severity levels.
One severity level
With only one severity level, there are only two patient groups, those receiving high quality (at Hospital 1) and those receiving low quality (at Hospital 2). Using the notational short-hand B i := B (q i ), the Lorenz curve is given by
where B := D 1 B 1 + (1 D 1 ) B 2 is average health outcome. The Gini coe¢ cient is then given by
and
All else equal, a marginal increase in the health outcome of patients at the high-quality (low-quality) hospital will increase (reduce) the Gini coe¢ cient. Furthermore, an increase in the market share of the high-quality hospital -which initially has the larger market share -will reduce the Gini coe¢ cient. Notice also that
Thus, a marginal increase in health outcome for all patients will, all else equal, reduce the Gini coe¢ cient. This is a re ‡ection of the Gini coe¢ cient being a relative measure of inequality, which is reduced when all patients experience an equal absolute increase in health status.
We can convert the Gini coe¢ cient to a measure of absolute inequality by multiplying G with the average health outcome, which yields the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient:
and @ e G @D 1 = (B 1 B 2 ) (2D 1 1) < 0:
As for the Gini coe¢ cient, a higher market share for the high-quality hospital will also reduce absolute inequality, whereas a marginal improvement in the health status of patients at the highquality (low-quality) hospital will increase (reduce) absolute inequality, as measured by the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient. However, for given patient allocations between the two hospitals, an equal absolute increase in the health status of all patients has no e¤ect on absolute inequality (i.e., @ e G=@B 1 + @ e G=@B 2 = 0).
Higher treatment price The e¤ect of a higher treatment price on absolute inequality, as given by the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient, is given by
where := B 1 B 2 , and where @ =@p is given by (24) .
A price increase a¤ects absolute inequality only if it a¤ects inequality due to the postcode lottery (given by @ =@p). Suppose that a higher price leads to increased inequality between the hospitals (@ =@p > 0), which implies a reallocation of patients towards the high-quality hospital (@D 1 =@p > 0). This has two counteracting e¤ects on the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient, given by the two terms in square brackets on the right-hand side of (42). One the one hand, for given market shares, absolute inequality increases because of increased inequality in health outcomes. However, the reallocation of patients towards the high-quality hospital implies that a lower share of patients experience low quality, which reduces the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient.
The relative strength of these two e¤ects depends on the initial quality di¤erence. If the quality di¤erence is small, so that D 1 is close to 1 2 and B 1 close to B 2 , then the …rst e¤ect dominates and a dispersion in health outcomes increases absolute inequality. On the other hand, if the quality di¤erence is very large, so that D 1 is close to 1, the second e¤ect dominates and further dispersion in health outcomes actually reduces absolute inequality.
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The e¤ect of a higher treatment price on relative inequality can be expressed as
The …rst term in (43) is completely equivalent to (42) and contains the two counteracting e¤ects described above. The second term, which is negative, is speci…c to the Gini coe¢ cient and re ‡ects the fact that G measures relative inequality. Even if @ =@p = 0, a higher price leads to a reduction in G. This is a pure level e¤ ect. Even if a price increase does not lead to any patient reallocations, the resulting higher quality at both hospitals reduces the relative health inequality between the two patient groups.
Increased patient choice The e¤ects of increased patient choice on absolute and relative inequality, respectively, are given by
and @G @r = 1
(45)
Comparing (44)-(45) with (42)-(43), we see that the e¤ects are similar to the e¤ects of a price increase, but with one additional sub-e¤ect, represented by the last term in (44) and in (45). For given quality levels, increased patient choice implies a reallocation of patients towards the highquality hospital. This e¤ect contributes to lower relative and absolute inequality. Thus, if a price increase and an increase in patient choice have the exact same e¤ect on quality at both hospitals, the scope for a subsequent reduction in (absolute and relative) inequality is larger in the case of increased patient choice.
We summarise the above analysis as follows:
Proposition 5 Suppose that all patients have the same severity level.
(i) If competition leads to a dispersion (convergence) of health outcomes between the two hospitals, this will, all else equal, contribute towards an increase (reduction) in absolute and relative inequality if the initial quality di¤ erence is su¢ ciently small, and towards a reduction (increase) in absolute and relative inequality if the initial quality di¤ erence is su¢ ciently large.
(ii) If the di¤ erence in health outcomes is una¤ ected by the degree of competition, a price increase has no e¤ ect on absolute inequality but reduces relative inequality, whereas an increase in patient choice reduces both absolute and relative inequality.
Two severity levels
The previous analysis with one severity level can be seen as an approximation of the case where severity di¤erences are small relative to quality di¤erences between the hospitals, such that a patient treated at the high-quality hospital always has a better health outcome than a patient treated at the low-quality hospital, regardless of severity.
Consider now the opposite, that severity di¤erences are large relative to quality di¤erences, in the sense that the health outcome is always better for a low-severity patient than for a high-severity patient, regardless of which hospital the patient is treated at. Thus, and using again the notational
In this case, the Lorenz curve is given by
coe¢ cient is given by
while the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient is given by
1. Competition can a¤ect inequalities due to the postcode lottery. For given patient allocations, this e¤ect is described in Proposition 3.
2. Competition can a¤ect inequalities between high-and low-severity patients. This e¤ect is described in Proposition 4.
3. Competition can a¤ect the relative shares of di¤erent patient groups, as highlighted by the analysis in the previous subsection, which is summarised in Proposition 5.
For the case of one severity level, the e¤ects along the third dimension listed above are straightforward. If competition leads to patient reallocation towards the high-quality (low-quality) hospital, this will -all else equal -contribute to lower (higher) inequality. For the case of two severity types, which implies four di¤erent patient groups, the e¤ects along this dimension are somewhat more complicated. To illustrate this, consider the e¤ect on absolute inequality of patient reallocation towards the high-quality hospital. From (48) we derive @ e G @D h
A reallocation of high-severity patients towards the high-quality hospital implies a reallocation of patients from the group with the worst health outcome to the group with the second-worst outcome. This will always reduce inequality. However, a reallocation of low-severity patients towards the high-quality hospital, which implies a reallocation of patients from the group with the second-best health outcome to the group with the best health outcome, will reduce inequality only if the latter group constitutes more than half of all patients, which requires that the share of high-severity patients ( ) is very low.
The e¤ects of increased competition on absolute and relative inequality are analytically given by some very involved expressions that yield limited additional insights. It is therefore more illustrative to display the e¤ects by numerical simulations based on our previous parameterisations. Table   3 shows the e¤ects of increased competition (higher price or increased patient choice) based on 28 the parameterisations in Example 1, with a quadratic health bene…t function. 6 We consider two di¤erent cases: = 1 2 and = 1. The latter case implies only one severity level and therefore removes e¤ects related to inequalities between high-and low-severity patients. Remaining parameter values: c 1 = 0, c 2 = 1 2 , h = l = = 1, k = h = l = 2:
In the example shown in Table 3 , a higher price leads to quality convergence whereas increased patient choice leads to quality dispersion. Despite decreasing marginal health gains, quality dispersion (convergence) also implies dispersion (convergence) in health outcomes for each severity type.
Consider …rst the case of = 1. The e¤ect of competition on absolute inequality (as measured by e G) is then determined by changes in inequality along two di¤erent dimensions. On the one hand, higher (lower) inequalities due to the postcode lottery contributes to higher (lower) absolute inequality, whereas, on the other hand, increased (reduced) market share of the high-quality hospital contributes to lower (higher) absolute inequality. These two e¤ects are always counteracting, as discussed in the previous sub-section. For the case of a price increase, the former e¤ect dominates.
The reduction in postcode inequality is su¢ ciently strong to reduce the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient.
However, for the case of increased patient choice, the overall e¤ect is non-monotonic. Absolute inequality increases as t is reduced from 2 to 1, but decreases as t reduced from 1 to 1 2 . This illustrates the …rst part of Proposition 6, which states that dispersion in health outcomes contributes towards more (less) inequality if the initial quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently small (large).
The e¤ects of competition on relative inequality (as measured by G) are qualitatively identical to the e¤ect on absolute quality, even if the former measure is sensitive to a level e¤ ect, whereby higher quality in itself reduces relative inequality. However, this e¤ect is not strong enough to prevent an increase in the Gini coe¢ cient when t is reduced from 2 to 1.
Consider now the case of = 1 2 . The e¤ect of competition on absolute and relative inequality is now determined also by changes in inequalities along a third dimension, namely inequalities between high-and low-severity types, as measured by . We see that competition always reduces inequality along this dimension, regardless of whether competition leads to quality convergence or quality dispersion. The reason is that high-severity patients bene…t more from higher quality than low-severity patients. The reduction of inequality along this dimension implies that increased competition always reduces both absolute and relative inequality for all the numerical values considered in this example.
In Table 4 we show an equivalent numerical analysis based on the parameterisation in Example 2. In the numerical examples shown in Table 4 , more competition (either by a higher price or by increased patient choice) always leads to quality dispersion. Because of the linearity of the health 30 bene…t function, this also implies that competition leads to increased postcode inequality. The implications for absolute and relative inequality are very similar to those shown in Table 3 , though.
The only di¤erence is that, for the case of = 1, the level e¤ ect is su¢ ciently strong to ensure that more competition leads to a monotonic reduction in relative inequality, even if the postcode inequality increases.
For the case of = 1 2 , more competition always leads to a reduction in both absolute and relative inequality. As for the examples shown in Table 3 , the driving force is the reduction in inequality between high-and low-severity patients. The strong negative e¤ect of competition on inequality along this dimension, for di¤erent parameterisations and di¤erent numerical parameter values, suggests that this is a fairly general result. Furthermore, our numerical simulations suggest that competition will lead to a reduction in both absolute and relative inequality for a wide range of parameters. In fact, for the two di¤erent parameterisations explored here, it is hard to …nd examples of the opposite as long as the shares of high-and low-severity patients are not too uneven.
Implications for empirical analyses
In this section we discuss possible approaches which could be pursued to test empirically how competition a¤ects health inequalities. First, to test for the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities due to postcode lottery, researchers could compute measures of dispersion of health outcomes, such as the standard deviation or the coe¢ cient of variation, within a given hospital catchment area and relate them to the degree of patient choice and market structure. For example, future empirical work could test whether in more competitive areas the introduction of patient choice policies lead to an increase or a reduction in AMI mortality dispersion across hospitals.
Second, to test for the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities a sub-group analysis by degree of severity may be appropriate. In line with Geppert and Kessler (2005) , high severity could be measured based on the number of previous hospital admissions preceding a health shock (such as AMI). By comparing the e¤ect of competition on mortality for high-and low-severity patients, we can infer the e¤ect on health inequalities across severity groups.
Third, the two types of inequality could be brought together by developing a Generalised Gini or Gini index in a given market area, where patients are ordered by their level of health, i.e., starting with patients with highest severity and lowest hospital quality and ending with patients with lowest severity and highest quality.
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Our analysis also illustrates the importance of patient 'composition e¤ects' when measuring the e¤ect of competition due to patients with high and low severity exercising choice to a di¤erent degree. Competition a¤ects di¤erentially the health gains for patients with di¤ering severity but also changes the number of patients receiving high and low quality through the composition e¤ect.
These will a¤ect both the Gini coe¢ cients and the simple measures of dispersion of health outcomes across hospitals.
The empirical literature which estimates patient choice models as a function of quality and severity tends to con…rm that high-severity patients are more likely to choose high-quality hospitals.
The elasticity of hospital demand to quality are however generally low and so are the interactions between quality and severity (see Brekke et al., 2014, Section 3.1, for a review of the evidence). We therefore conjecture that overall composition e¤ects are likely to be small in empirical analyses.
Finally, our analysis highlights the importance of distinguishing empirically between quality and health outcomes. Although health outcomes are often used as a proxy of hospital quality, our study highlights how inequalities in qualities do not necessarily go hand-in-hand with inequalities in health outcomes. In relation to inequalities due to postcode lottery, an increase in inequalities in quality across hospitals is compatible with a reduction in health inequalities across hospitals if the marginal health gain is decreasing, so that patients in high-quality hospitals bene…t less from a given quality increase than do patients in low-quality hospitals. Similarly, an increase in quality di¤erences across hospitals is compatible with a reduction in health inequalities across severity types and this is due to patients with higher severity bene…ting more from the increase in quality compared to patients with lower severity.
Concluding remarks
Several OECD countries have introduced pro-market policy interventions in the health sector with the aim of stimulating quality of care. Such policies are generally contentious and the subject of an intense political debate. The existing literature has extensively investigated, both theoretically and empirically, the e¤ect of competition on quality but there is very little work on its impact on equity. This is surprising given that reduction in health inequalities is an ubiquitous policy objective. Our study has contributed to …ll this gap in knowledge by carefully characterising the conditions under which competition (i) increases or reduces the gap between high-quality and low-quality hospitals (due to postcode lottery), and, as a result, (ii) contributes to an increase or reduction in health inequalities.
Our …rst key …nding is that the e¤ect of competition on hospital quality gap depends on demand and supply factors a¤ecting health care provision, more precisely captured by (i) the marginal health gains from quality -a demand parameter -and (ii) the extent to which quality a¤ects marginal treatment costs -a supply parameter. Our most clear-cut result is that competition, regardless of how it is measured, is more likely to lead to quality convergence across hospitals if marginal health gains decrease with quality at a faster rate. The answer also depends, to some extent, on how we measure competition, whether by an increase in the …xed price or by an increase in the degree of patient choice. Cost factors increase the scope for quality dispersion when competition is measured by an increase in price, but not necessarily when measured by patient choice. Such factors will vary by medical condition, diagnosis and treatment. For example, standardised treatments such as cataract surgery will have treatment costs mildly increasing with quality. This may not be the case for more serious treatments, such as a coronary bypass, where costs will increase more rapidly with quality.
Our second key …nding is that health inequalities due to postcode lottery go hand in hand with health inequalities but only if health gains are not too concave in quality. Instead, we …nd that competition generally reduces health inequalities across patients with di¤erent severity, because high-severity patients bene…t more from higher quality than do low-severity patients. This reduction can be strengthened or weakened by what we refer to as 'composition e¤ects', which relate to competition inducing more high-severity patients to exercise choice and to select hospitals with higher quality. Reductions in inequalities across severity types also drive reductions in the Gini and Generalised Gini coe¢ cients, which aggregate di¤erent sources of health inequalities both across hospitals and severity types.
Finally, we highlight that measuring the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities through simple measures of dispersion or through the Gini coe¢ cient is important since di¤erent measures can lead to di¤erent conclusions. If competition increases di¤erences in health outcomes across hospitals, the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient may still reduce due to the composition e¤ects, and the Gini coe¢ cient will reduce further as a result of the overall increase in quality.
In terms of policy implications, our analysis highlights that whether competition induces an equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ depends on the particular dimension of equity which policy makers focus on. For example, if policy makers focus on equity due to postcode lottery, then an equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ may arise though it is less likely to be the case when demand parameters are more important. An equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ is instead unlikely when considering equity across severity types if more severe patients tend to bene…t more than low-severity ones from increases in quality.
Our study provides a theoretical framework to guide future empirical work. Future empirical studies should focus not only on testing the e¤ect of competition on quality, but also its equity implications. This can be done, as discussed in Section 5, by developing measures of dispersions in quality and health outcomes within a given hospital catchment or market area, and then by relating these to changes in patient choice and in prices through consolidated econometric strategies. @D 1 @q 1 @D 2 @q 2 3 7 5 dp = 0;
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